



# Security Council

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## Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus

### I. Introduction

1. The Security Council, in its resolution [2771 \(2025\)](#), requested the Secretary General to submit a report on his good offices by 4 July 2025, in particular on progress towards reaching a consensus starting point for meaningful results-oriented negotiations to lead to a settlement. In the resolution, the Council encouraged the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to provide written updates to the Secretary-General's mission of good offices on the action that they had taken in support of the relevant parts of the resolution since its adoption, in particular with regard to paragraphs 6 to 9, with a view to reaching a sustainable and comprehensive settlement, and requested the Secretary-General to include the contents of those updates in the report. The updates submitted by the two leaders are contained in annexes I and II to the present report.

2. The report covers developments from 12 December 2024 to 11 June 2025. It provides an update on the activities carried out by the Secretary-General's mission of good offices. The report also covers the engagement of the Secretary-General and other senior United Nations officials, including the newly appointed Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General on Cyprus, with the parties.

### II. Significant developments

3. During the reporting period there was increased engagement with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders and the guarantor Powers, following the work of the Personal Envoy between January and July 2024 and the informal dinner hosted by the Secretary-General in October 2024 with the leaders from both sides. The leaders had their first formal meeting together on 20 January 2025, under the auspices of the United Nations. The engagement continued in February with a visit to Cyprus by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary A. DiCarlo, and subsequent consultations with the guarantor Powers.

4. The Secretary-General convened an informal meeting in a broader format in Geneva on 17 and 18 March 2025, the first such meeting since April 2021. In addition to the leaders, Nikos Christodoulides and Ersin Tatar, it brought together the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Greece and Türkiye and the Minister of State for Europe of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. At the request of the United Nations, the majority of the delegations, including the Greek Cypriot and Turkish



Cypriot delegations, included a minimum of 30 per cent women as members. Despite the continuing differences in positions regarding the Cyprus issue, the two leaders agreed on a number of initiatives to build trust, including the opening of four crossing points, demining, the creation of a technical committee on youth, initiatives on the environment and climate change, including the impacts on mining areas, solar energy in the buffer zone and the restoration of cemeteries. It was also decided that the next meeting in this format would be held at the end of July and it was agreed that the Secretary-General would appoint a Personal Envoy on Cyprus.

5. Since the meeting in Geneva, the leaders met twice in Cyprus under the auspices of the United Nations, on 2 April and 5 May. They focused their discussions on the six initiatives agreed to in Geneva and announced progress on some of them. In a significant move, on 5 May, the leaders jointly launched the technical committee on youth, the first one in a decade since the previous technical committees – on culture, education and gender equality – were established. The two leaders also agreed on the restoration of 30 cemeteries by the technical committee on cultural heritage and to work together on projects on the environment and climate change, with the technical committee on environment in the lead.

6. On 2 May, the Secretary-General announced the appointment of María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar as his Personal Envoy on Cyprus. He asked Ms. Holguín to re-engage with the parties in order to work on next steps and to advise him on the Cyprus issue. The Personal Envoy visited Cyprus from 24 to 31 May, meeting separately with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders and their representatives, as well as other key interlocutors. She also engaged with the guarantor Powers, including through visits to Türkiye and Greece on 2 and 5 June, respectively. Through these engagements, the Personal Envoy has urged the sides to use the limited time ahead of the next broader format meeting, to be held in July, to redouble their efforts towards the implementation of all the agreements reached in Geneva.

7. While the public on both sides remained rather sceptical that progress could be achieved on the overall political process in the coming period, the outcome of the broader format meeting in March was widely welcomed as a positive result reflecting the Secretary-General's personal commitment. The visit by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs in February and the appointment and visit of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General on Cyprus in May were welcomed by the leaders and well supported by the public and civil society on both sides by and relevant international stakeholders.

### **III. Background and context**

8. The guarantor Powers Greece and Türkiye have sustained their high-level bilateral contacts and have reaffirmed their commitment to improving relations. Their rapprochement continuing, despite their differences, is noteworthy in the Eastern Mediterranean region and also creates an environment more conducive to efforts to revive the dialogue on the Cyprus issue.

9. In Cyprus, political tensions have risen over a spate of arrests of individuals accused of selling or marketing Greek Cypriot property in the north without permission from the dispossessed owners. Tensions also rose in the north, with weeks of protests related to legislation allowing headscarves in schools and its possible ramifications for secularism. These developments come in advance of the Turkish Cypriot leadership contest in October.

10. The security situation on the island continues to be relatively calm, during a period of increased engagement and dialogue in the peace process, but violations of the buffer zone and challenges to the United Nations authority remain a concern.

11. Regular meetings of representatives of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot political parties under the auspices of the Embassy of Slovakia continued during the reporting period, with the participation of 18 political parties from across the island, now including the bicomunal political party Volt formed in 2023.

12. Within the framework of the Religious Track of the Cyprus Peace Process, under the auspices of the Embassy of Sweden, efforts continued to further develop the cooperation among the different religious communities and faith-based institutions living on both sides of the island to advance human rights and religious freedom together.

13. The high-level meetings and events that were held during the reporting period generated an increase in civil society activity and calls for a resumption of negotiations. The public on both sides continues to express frustration with the lack of concrete progress and the negative rhetoric between the two leaders. At the same time, recent polling conducted in both communities by the mission of good offices found that respondents who had contact with members of the other community continue to be more positive and trusting of the other community, as well as more confident that the communities could live peacefully together. In addition, the results found that an overwhelming majority of respondents on both sides believe that the United Nations should continue to provide support to the leadership of both communities to discuss a settlement.

#### **IV. Status of the process: activities of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices**

14. During the reporting period, the Secretary-General's mission of good offices promoted intra-island contact, cooperation and trust-building and engaged with international partners regarding the activities of the mission. The Deputy Special Adviser held 95 meetings with the two leaders and their representatives, political parties, religious leaders, civil society organizations, including women and youth groups, the European Union, the World Bank and the diplomatic community, as well as with visiting senior officials from Member State capitals. Also during the reporting period, working-level regional consultations were not held, due to the reduction of the budget of the mission and liquidity pressures rendering regular in-person engagement with the key interlocutors, including the guarantor powers and the European Union, unfeasible.

15. Ongoing dialogue in Cyprus facilitated by the Secretary-General's mission of good offices with representatives of both sides also continued through meetings with the Greek Cypriot negotiator and the Turkish Cypriot special representative, with the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot coordinators of the technical committees, and with the facilitators of the now 13 technical committees, with members from both communities represented. The regular meetings provided an avenue for the sides to move forward on the initiatives agreed to in Geneva and other proposals of the technical committees, and to address issues of shared concern.

16. The informal meeting held in Geneva in March gave impetus to the work of the technical committees, originally formed in 2008 by the leaders of the two communities in the context of the peace process. The committees continued to meet under the auspices of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices, with support from the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. Activities of the technical

committees were sustained at an encouraging level, with a total of over 130 meetings, and the membership remaining at gender parity – with 52 per cent men and 48 per cent women across just over 200 committee members.

17. In follow-up to the informal meeting held in March and coinciding with the 10-year anniversary of the 2015 launch of the youth and peace and security agenda, the recent establishment of the technical committee on youth comes at a particularly timely moment. In addition, the technical committee on cultural heritage was tasked by the leaders to identify cemeteries to be restored as a way to build trust. On 5 May, the two leaders approved the list of 30 sites identified by the committee and work to implement this decision has begun. In addition, the committee remained active by leading the restoration of several sites of cultural and historical importance. The technical committee on environment was tasked by the two leaders to work on initiatives concerning the environment, climate change and areas affected by mining sites. It also continues projects to jointly address pests threatening biodiversity and economic sectors and projects on environmental education and awareness.

18. Other technical committees demonstrated good performance and consistent engagement. The technical committee on crisis management maintained an open communication channel, vital for emergencies, while the technical committee on crime and criminal matters continued to be active, facilitating over a hundred instances of information exchange through the Joint Contact Rooms in Nicosia and Pyla/Pile. The technical committee on economic and commercial matters met on a monthly basis, benefiting from new expert members and focusing on practical goals, such as improving bank transactions and reducing trade barriers. The technical committee on health provided critical engagement and assistance on an ongoing basis to patients in need, often at short notice. The technical committee on culture, despite some delays, advanced three public-facing initiatives with broad cultural appeal. The technical committee on humanitarian matters agreed to a project on disability and sustainability, with the aim of better understanding the needs and challenges faced by persons with disabilities across the island of Cyprus and ensure their meaningful participation. The implementation of the expansion of the Agios Dometios/Metehan crossing under the technical committee on crossings is expected to start in September 2025.

19. Some technical committees faced challenges with irregular meetings or slower progress. The technical committee on gender equality made no progress in implementing its action plan. The technical committee on broadcasting and telecommunication only met once during the reporting period, although it continued to fulfil its core mandate of addressing frequency interference. The technical committee on education resumed its activities, with discussions on a project on environmental sustainability among students across the island.

20. The second phase of the support facility to the technical committees, implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in close coordination with the mission, continues to support mutually agreed initiatives. As of 11 June 2025, approximately 74 per cent of the total budget of 1 million euros had been utilized, compared with the utilization rate of 24 per cent at the end of 2023.

21. There has been a noticeable increase in women-led initiatives and organizations coming together to explore ways to positively impact the political process. In this context, the mission of good offices continued to support women's organizations and women-led initiatives through multiple events, including a round table co-organized with the Cyprus Women Bi-Communal Coalition, with the participation of the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, on 10 February. The event brought together bicommunal women's organizations from across the island. A second event was organized on 29 April.

22. Leveraging sports as a tool for fostering mutual understanding and breaking down prejudices continued to be an idea promoted by the mission. With the support of UNDP, the mission premiered a documentary film titled “Runite”, memorializing the island’s first coast-to-coast run organized by a bicomunal running association.

23. Promoting existing intra-island economic ties while fostering new ones remained a prominent objective of the mission during the reporting period. On 13 March, the mission hosted a joint event with the World Bank to discuss living standards and economic opportunities, which brought together local economists, entrepreneurs, representatives from Chambers of Commerce and Industry and members of the technical committee on economic and commercial matters. This event highlighted the importance of bridging data gaps and gathering evidence-based insights. It took place only a few weeks after the launch by the Cyprus Dialogue Forum of the first-ever island-wide Labour Market Guide, a trilingual open-access resource that consolidates key employment, cost-of-living and trade indicators, addressing previously fragmented or unavailable labour market data for the island.

24. In 2024, Green Line Regulation trade amounted to 15.2 million euros (compared with total exports of the Republic of Cyprus of 2.14 billion euros in 2024), a decrease of 5 per cent compared with 2023. During the reporting period, no new products were authorized for Green Line trade. There was a decrease compared with the previous year in the number of crossings by Greek Cypriots and an increase in the number of crossings by Turkish Cypriots, in large part due to increased prices in the north. Barriers to increased trade across the Green Line remain, including as regards to crossings, banking and financial transactions.

25. On 15 May, the long-awaited Pedieos/Kanlı Dere River project was launched, extending the existing linear park in the south through the Ledra Palace crossing point to the north.

## V. Observations

26. It is reassuring to see the concrete steps taken in Geneva at the informal broader format meeting in held in March, with a number of specific initiatives agreed upon that have the potential to build trust between the two sides. This, together with the decision by all parties to hold another informal meeting at the end of July, their agreement to the appointment of my Personal Envoy and the meetings between the leaders on the island, are indications of more focused efforts to find a way forward on the Cyprus issue. If the two sides remain committed, further positive steps are possible.

27. I welcome the increased engagement and activity on the island during this reporting period, in particular, the meetings between the two Cypriot leaders and their representatives, facilitated by the United Nations. I urge the two sides to demonstrate a spirit of compromise with respect to crossing points and the solar project in the buffer zone, given that an agreement on these issues would be a meaningful signal of political will ahead of any broader format meeting. In view of the demand on both sides, and the critical nature of crossings to increase interactions, trade and economic interdependency, I encourage the two leaders to conclude an agreement on crossing points without delay. A solar photovoltaic plant in the buffer zone would be a prime example of sustainable energy cooperation that would benefit both sides of the island. Related to this, I reiterate that natural resources in and around the island should benefit both communities and constitute an incentive to pursue mutually acceptable solutions to disagreements related to such resources.

28. I firmly believe in the power of continuing dialogue to increase trust in the Cyprus context. Therefore, it is important to work together on the next steps – including towards the upcoming informal meeting in a broader format with the sides and the guarantor powers expected to be held in late July. Acknowledging the continued difference in positions regarding the peace process, I urge the parties to engage in substantive discussions in addition to trust building initiatives.

29. I commend the important achievements during the reporting period of the active technical committees. The technical committees remain an established framework accepted by both sides, and it is laudable that they continue to function, despite the absence of active negotiations. Any limitations to progress should be removed by the two leaders and their representatives.

30. Welcoming the launch of the long-anticipated extension of the Pedieos/Kanlı Dere River project, I appreciate the support of the European Union and UNDP as implementing partners to realize the enlargement of this important green space in the heart of Nicosia through the buffer zone and north.

31. I appreciate the continuous support of the European Union for the technical committees through its support facility, administered by UNDP. I call upon the leaders and their representatives to ensure that this support is fully utilized in a mutually agreed manner and to the benefit of all Cypriots.

32. I once again echo the call by the Security Council for greater engagement with civil society and urge the two leaders to encourage contact and cooperation between the two communities.

33. The two leaders should consult with the technical committee on gender equality, as well as with civil society at large, including women's organizations and youth, to identify concrete steps that can hopefully lead to tangible progress in the coming period as well as during future negotiations. I commend the two sides on the membership of the now 13 technical committees, which are at gender parity.

34. I note with concern the lack of progress to promote peace education across the island. The two leaders should empower the Technical Committee on Education to work towards the implementation of the recommendations of its 2017 joint report and support peace education projects, such as the award-winning Imagine Project, implemented by the bicomunal Association for Historical Dialogue and Research and supported by the Home for Cooperation.

35. Intra-island trade and increased economic ties, as a means of reconnecting the two communities separated for decades, requires the support from the highest levels in each community. I therefore regret the persistent obstacles to Green Line Regulation trade, in contradiction to European Union rules. I urge that these obstacles, as well as challenges concerning banking and financial matters, be removed without further delay.

36. I remain concerned over unilateral actions by both sides in and around the buffer zone, which undermine the military status quo of the area, the integrity of the buffer zone and the Security Council mandate there, and which are not conducive to the broader peace process. I continue to follow the situation in the fenced-off area of Varosha and reiterate that the position of the United Nations on Varosha remains unchanged. I recall the decisions of the Security Council on the matter, notably in its resolutions [550 \(1984\)](#) and [789 \(1992\)](#), and underscore the importance of adhering fully to those resolutions.

37. Considering the important role that the guarantor powers of Greece, Türkiye and the United Kingdom, play in the Cyprus peace process, I call upon them to continue

contributing constructively to the ongoing efforts to find a mutually acceptable way forward.

38. I remain committed to maintaining contact and dialogue with the sides, as well as with the guarantor powers, in search of a path towards a peaceful settlement, and remain guided by relevant Security Council resolutions that have established United Nations parameters.

39. I would like to thank the partners once again, including the European Union and the World Bank, that have continued to provide support to the work of the United Nations missions in Cyprus, UNDP and the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus and that have contributed to the implementation of confidence-building measures. Lastly, I would like to thank my Personal Envoy on Cyprus, as well as my Special Representative, who also serves as Deputy Special Adviser, and the personnel serving in my good offices mission in Cyprus for the dedication and commitment that they have brought to their work.

## Annex I

### **Written update by the Greek Cypriot leader to the Good Offices Mission of the Secretary-General, pursuant to and in accordance with UNSCR 2771 (2025)**

This submission is made in response to the encouragement in UN Security Council Resolution 2771 (2025), “to provide written updates every six months to the Good Offices Mission of the Secretary - General on the actions they have taken in support of the relevant parts of this resolution since its adoption, in particular with regard to paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9, with a view to reaching a sustainable and comprehensive settlement ...”.

The present update includes all developments relevant to the effort to resume the peace process in the framework of the Good Offices Mission of the United Nations Secretary General. References to communities are without prejudice to the Republic of Cyprus as a Member State of the United Nations and references to UNFICYP are made without prejudice to the Republic of Cyprus as the Force’s host country.

#### **I. Efforts to resume the peace process**

I maintain the steadfast conviction that a solution to the Cyprus problem on the mutually agreed federal basis endorsed by the UN Security Council constitutes the only viable and sustainable path forward, which can secure the vital interests of Cyprus and all Cypriots. It is also the only path towards ensuring and safeguarding security and stability in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region, a parameter which is of fundamental significance in light of the ongoing regional and international geopolitical developments.

I wish to highlight that a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem should be pursued exclusively within the basis prescribed by relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, the High-Level Agreements and in line with the UN Charter.

I reaffirm my commitment to the *acquis* of the negotiations and the body of work, that has been accomplished up until the closure of the Conference on Cyprus in Crans Montana, in July 2017, which comprises the agreed basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality as prescribed in relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, the convergences achieved on all negotiating chapters and the six points presented by the UN Secretary General in Crans Montana.

I wish to express my utmost appreciation to the UN Secretary General for his steadfast commitment – including through the re-appointment of his Personal Envoy Ms. María Angela Holguín Cuéllar – and for their continued efforts towards the resumption of negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

I also express deep gratitude for the efforts of Under Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, who visited the island on 10 February 2025 in the context of the preparation for the broader meeting that took place in Geneva in March.

We are also profoundly grateful to the UN Security Council for its steadfast support.

I have genuinely engaged with the UNSG Personal Envoy throughout her mission, both in 2024 and also since 12 May 2025, when she resumed her task, following the outcome of the informal broader meeting that took place in Geneva on 17–18 March.



In the said meeting, as per the longstanding practice in meetings with broader format that include the contractual parties to the 1960 Treaties, I represented the Republic of Cyprus – through my capacity as President - as a contracting party to the said treaties, whilst also representing the Greek Cypriot community for the intercommunal aspects of the discussions.

I took part in the meeting with the political will for a meaningful and substantial discussion and with the aim of achieving tangible outcomes on the way forward for the Cyprus problem. I reaffirmed my readiness to continue my efforts for the creation of win-win conditions for all involved in the context of the EU – Türkiye relations and beyond, and my earnest hope that an equivalent spirit will be manifested by Türkiye and by the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community as well as my firm belief that an alternative paradigm based on the concept that respective interests can be mutually reinforcing instead of perpetually antagonistic, is both attainable and indispensable for the genuine long-term interests of all.

In this regard, I welcome the decision by the European Commission to designate Mr. Johannes Hahn as Special Envoy for Cyprus. My expectation is that this will among others reflect the vital contribution that the EU can make to the UN-led efforts for a solution to the Cyprus problem since the Union possesses tools that can be beneficial for all involved.

I am glad that the Geneva informal meeting last March, has led to specific outcomes: the reappointment of a UNSG Personal Envoy to prepare next steps, a decision to hold a next meeting in the same format at the end of July and the decision to pursue six initiatives with the aim of building trust (the opening of four crossing points, demining, the creation of a technical committee on youth, initiatives on the environment and climate change including the impact on mining areas; solar energy and the restoration of cemeteries).

During the period under review, I met with Mr. Tatar in Cyprus under UN auspices, on 20 January, 2 April and 5 May 2025, whilst our representatives met nine times during the same period. So far, we have accomplished the appointment of the members and the launching of the Technical Committee on Youth, the commencement of the work for the restoration of cemeteries, and the initiation of steps in the field of the environment. Further work along with a more constructive engagement on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot side is required in order to achieve results on the remaining issues, namely, crossing points, solar energy and demining.

I have also continued my initiatives with a view to contributing to a broader conducive environment. Within this framework, Türkiye's Foreign Minister Mr. Fidan participated in the informal meeting of EU Foreign Affairs Ministers in August 2024 and at the aftermath of the Gymnich in May 2025. Moreover, I had the opportunity to meet with Türkiye's President Mr. Erdogan and Foreign Minister Mr. Fidan in Budapest on 7 November 2024 in the margins of the European Political Community summit, with Mr. Fidan in Baku on 12 November 2024, in the context of COP29, and again with Mr. Erdogan in the meeting of the European Political Community at Tirana, on 16 May 2025. These, manifest both at the symbolic level but also at the level of substance, that an alternative paradigm in our relations can be both feasible and mutually beneficial. Moreover, the Republic of Cyprus has not blocked the candidacy of Türkiye for the post of the Secretary General of the OSCE. It is noted that our candidacy for the Chairpersonship of the OSCE for 2027 has been tabled.

We also continue to implement our policies towards our Turkish Cypriot compatriots, which is yet another manifestation of our concrete determination to work for a conducive environment towards reaching a breakthrough. Also notable is the fact that the value of Green Line Trade reached €15.238 million in 2024, maintaining

the strong trend of recent years. The unobstructed trade of products from the government controlled to the non-government-controlled area is further required to enhance confidence between the communities.

Regrettably, the creation and cultivation of an appropriate environment, conducive to the resumption of negotiations, continues to be undermined by Türkiye's policies which raise tensions and create new *faits accomplis* on the ground.

This approach is manifested, *inter alia*, by the following:

(i) The continued refusal to uphold the commitment to the agreed basis of bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, and the active promotion of the position for "sovereign equality" and "equal international status", which essentially amounts to a call for a "two-state" solution, in clear violation of the UNSC Resolutions.

(ii) The illegal exploitation of properties in the occupied part of Cyprus belonging to Greek Cypriot displaced persons, which has acquired new dimensions, contrary to fundamental principles of International Law and relevant rulings by the European Court of Human Rights. Such actions constitute yet another attempt to solidify the illegal *fait accompli* and to further curtail prospects for a solution.

(iii) The continuation of the upgrading of military capabilities and infrastructure in the occupied part of Cyprus.

(iv) The continued refusal and lack of compliance with relevant UNSC Resolutions calling for the return of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants along with a continued limitation on the movement of UNFICYP therein.

(v) The continuation of "moves forward" into the buffer zone, south of the Turkish Forces' ceasefire line.

(vi) The continuous threats to proceed with the construction of a road in the buffer zone in the Pyla area, linking the occupied areas with the TK15 advanced position of the Turkish Forces, in violation of the status quo and the understanding reached in October 2023.

(vii) The continuation of efforts in pursuit of the international upgrading of the illegal secessionist entity, contrary to international law and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, in particular [541\(1983\)](#) and [550\(1984\)](#).

(viii) The demand of the Turkish Cypriot side for the conclusion of a "Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)" with the UN, contrary to the legally binding principle that such agreements are being concluded only between the UN and the governments of UN Member States that host peacekeeping operations; in this case, the Republic of Cyprus, as enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution [186\(1964\)](#) and reaffirmed in numerous subsequent Resolutions.

## II. Effective mechanism for military contacts

Given the need to defuse tensions, I maintain my readiness to discuss the establishment of a mechanism for military contacts between the opposing forces in Cyprus, facilitated by UNFICYP.

Such a mechanism will comprise the National Guard and the Turkish occupation forces, at the level of their Commanders or their designated representatives, facilitated by UNFICYP at the respective level, in accordance with its mandate as prescribed by UN Security Council Resolution [186\(1964\)](#).

### III. Missing Persons

The work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) remains a fundamental aspect of the peace process and the support of all parties is indeed imperative. To draw attention and to express support to the vitally important humanitarian work of the CMP, upon my initiative, a joint visit by myself and Mr. Tatar to the anthropological laboratory of the CMP took place on July 28, 2023 and a joint call has been issued to accelerate the process of location, exhumation and identification of remains of missing persons.

Türkiye has a legal and an ethical obligation to account for the fate of persons who went missing in life threatening circumstances while in Turkish custody or control. This obligation is not discharged by the Committee of Missing Persons. Türkiye is at the very least required to provide full information from its archives, so as to help determine the fate of missing persons in Cyprus and possible burial sites, as well as to provide full and unhindered access to the CMP to suspected burial sites.

Given the critical passage of time, I wish to reiterate my call for information from all countries and organizations that had a military or police presence in Cyprus in 1963, 1964 and 1974, and might be in possession of relevant archives.

### IV. Enclaved Greek Cypriots

At a moment when we endeavour to build confidence, severe restrictions continue to be imposed on the enclaved Greek Cypriots in the Karpas peninsula and the Maronites in Kormakitis. These include censorship of school textbooks and the rejection of teachers appointed to the schools, which has obstructed the operation of the Kormakitis kindergarten. The prohibition of access to the schools in Rizokarpaso by technical and educational staff continues to undermine its smooth operation.

### V. Technical Committees

The Technical Committees continue their work under UN auspices aiming to alleviate the daily life of people from the adverse effects of the status quo, on the basis of their terms of reference as agreed between the leaders of the two communities since 8 July 2006. They constitute an integral part of the peace process and of the overall effort for a solution. The Technical Committees continue to benefit from the invaluable support provided by the European Union, for which I would like to reiterate my utmost appreciation.

The Technical Committee on Youth was launched on 16 April 2025, with their first meeting taking place on 5 May 2025, in the presence of myself and Mr. Tatar. Envisioning a common future through the perspective of young people carries great significance for our effort. The composition of the committee has also reinforced the commitment for gender parity in the peace process.

Regrettably, there have been cases of the Technical Committees' work being impeded, as a result of attempts by the other side to use them as vehicles for the promotion of cooperation between "separate administrations" in the overall context of its "two states" policy.

The most indicative example remains the Technical Committee on Education, where, despite repeated calls by our side, as well as by the UN and international partners, the Turkish Cypriot side has yet to reverse the decision it took in October 2022 to suspend its participation in the award-winning peace education project

“Imagine”, and continues to hamper the implementation of other Committee projects that promote peace and reconciliation through education.

The Technical Committee on Culture is implementing ideas from the follow-up networking event bringing together Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot artists. A website to promote the work of the Technical Committee has also been launched.

The Technical Committee on Crossings continues its work in the direction of improvement of the operation of existing crossing points. Works to improve the road network at the Ayios Dometios crossing point, are expected to commence soon.

The Technical Committee on Gender Equality has continued its work in the context of the Action Plan for women’s full, equal and meaningful participation in the peace process.

The Technical Committee on Economic and Commercial Matters continues discussions on ways to further advance trade through the “Green Line Regulation” and on other issues of economic and trade nature.

The Technical Committee on Crime and Criminal Matters has maintained a well-functioning channel for contact and communication through the Joint Contact Rooms (JCRs), in the effort to effectively respond to criminal activity.

The Technical Committee on Health has further continued its exchange of information relating to infectious diseases, including the monitoring of epidemics and dangerous mosquito species. It has also continued to provide a channel to respond to requests on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community for the provision of certain medicines and health treatments.

The Technical Committee on Crisis Management has continued discussions on a simplified proposal for a crisis response procedure, prescribing the steps to be undertaken for effective response in the event of a natural or human-caused disaster, and has initiated a discussion on earthquake preparedness and response.

The Technical Committee on the Environment has maintained strong engagement on a variety of issues and has undertaken the implementation of initiatives to build trust on the environment and climate change, including the impact on mining areas. A project to protect the population of bees has also been approved during the reporting period.

The Technical Committee on Telecommunications and Broadcasting continues its work to implement the project “Transition to Green Energy: The Future of Electronic Telecommunications”, while maintaining a channel to address radiofrequency interference.

The Technical Committee on Humanitarian Issues has agreed to implement a project titled “Inclusive Cyprus: Island-wide forum on disability and sustainability”.

The Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage continues its outstanding work for the restoration of monuments of Cyprus’ cultural heritage, including the restoration of cemeteries. The Committee has rightfully received broad acknowledgement and recognition over the years, and should be further supported in order to be able to continue and further enhance its important work.

Lastly, I concur with the Secretary General’s assessment in the Report on his Good Offices Mission of July 2024, that *“While underscoring the importance of the work of the technical committees and the positive impact that confidence-building measures could have, I believe that only genuine progress towards reaching a consensus starting point for negotiations leading to a mutually acceptable settlement will reassure Cypriots as well as the international community that a peaceful and shared future on the island truly remains possible.”*

## Annex II

### **Actions taken by the Turkish Cypriot Side in support of the relevant parts of the Security Council Resolution 2771 (2025)**

As the 5th President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, I have now completed more than four-and-a-half years of my term in office. Throughout this period, I have put forward a new vision that departs from the longstanding misdiagnosis and misguided treatment that have kept the Cyprus issue unresolved for 62 years. This vision is fully aligned with the call of the United Nations Secretary-General, who has underlined that “this time must be different.”

The Turkish Cypriot Side demands an end to the inequality of status between the two sides, which persists due to the current status quo. In such an environment, how can trust be built in the face of a Greek Cypriot policy that, for 62 years, has consistently and deliberately worked to maintain the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot People? The Greek Cypriot side continues to usurp the status it has unlawfully and unjustly assumed to isolate us in every aspect of life, including, but not limited to, our direct trade, direct flights, and direct contacts, which we refer to as the “3Ds”. The primary reason a settlement to the Cyprus issue remains unattainable to date is the fact that the international community continues to allow this unlawful and inhumane policy to persist. Therefore, we call for the reaffirmation of our inherent rights, namely, sovereign equality and equal international status. Only with the confirmation of our inherent rights can a meaningful and results-oriented negotiation process begin.

In this context, I would like to share recent developments that have taken place on the island over the past six months, including dialogue, consultations, and latest on Greek Cypriot leaderships’ hostile policy towards the Turkish Cypriot Side.

I welcome the reappointment of the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy, María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar. Ms. Holguín’s conclusion during her first tenure, regarding the absence of a common ground between the two sides has provided valuable clarity in understanding the current context of the Cyprus issue. Her principled emphasis on the indispensable role of dialogue, diplomacy, and determination has been a meaningful contribution to the overall landscape. The lack of common ground confirmed our position that the long-standing and repeatedly failed basis has reached its limits and the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation model no longer constitutes the common ground for a negotiated settlement to the Cyprus issue, and is officially and effectively exhausted.

In this regard, it is noteworthy that the UN Secretary-General himself acknowledged this reality, which is the lack of common ground between the sides to start a new and formal process, in both his spokesperson’s statement following the 15 October 2024 informal dinner in New York and in his six-monthly good offices report. While such recognition at the highest level is welcome, it is a matter of concern that the UN Security Council has refrained from reflecting this acknowledgment in its resolution. Nevertheless, the omission of the UN Security Council to make any reference to even the need for a critical look ahead demonstrates very clearly where the problem lies. Even when the truth is told in Cyprus, those who need to act upon it may choose not to do so.

The informal meeting in a broader format which convened in Geneva three months ago, with the participation of the two Leaders, Foreign Ministers of Guarantor Motherlands and a state minister from the third guarantor, had the potential to provide a new beginning. Unfortunately, the way this opportunity unfolded fell short of expectations, primarily due to the approach adopted by the Greek Cypriot leader.

Rather than offering proposals that could create new avenues for cooperation, the Greek Cypriot leader reiterated the same eight elements previously tabled at the Leaders' meeting held on 20 January 2025.

At this meeting, Mr. Christodoulides presented himself both as the “president of the republic of Cyprus” and as the “representative of the Greek Cypriot community” — thereby complicating the tone and dynamics of the meeting.

Additionally, the Greek Cypriot leader dismissed my cooperation proposal on the grounds that the areas mentioned therein fell within EU competences, or that they implied engagement between sovereign states. Even the term cooperation was questioned by him, since according to him it had other connotations. This approach stood in stark contrast with the constructive engagement undertaken by the Turkish Cypriot Side.

In the lead-up to the Geneva meeting, we have conducted extensive consultations with various interlocutors, including the UN Undersecretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. These engagements reflected a genuine commitment of the Turkish Cypriot Side in exploring practical and mutually beneficial areas of cooperation.

In this spirit, I, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot Side, presented a detailed proposal for a Cyprus Cooperation Council (CCC). This initiative covered twelve thematic areas and was structured to be inclusive, balanced, and neutral in language. It was designed to include both leaders, their respective negotiators, and relevant thematic team leaders. In addition to providing a mechanism for structured cooperation, the proposal also offered a means to address emerging issues of conflict through dialogue and diplomacy before they escalate. Regrettably, the proposal was rejected outright by the Greek Cypriot leader without due consideration.

Despite this, six initiatives were agreed upon in Geneva. Progress has been made on three of these: the establishment of a Technical Committee on Youth, and initial work on the restoration of cemeteries and cooperation on impact of climate change. These efforts were reinforced during the 2 April 2025 leaders' meeting on the island.

The remaining three initiatives, however, are yet to advance, despite their potential to deliver meaningful benefits:

**Demining:** The Greek Cypriot leader does not share my objective of a mine-free island. He is not in favor of complete clearance of mines. Instead, he opts to create the impression that demining activities are underway. If we were to proceed with a results-oriented approach, it makes sense to start with areas known to contain mines. Yet, he does not want to do that.

**Solar Power Plant in the Buffer Zone:** This pioneering initiative holds promise for shared benefit and environmental cooperation. However, progress has been impeded by the Greek Cypriot side's insistence on direct control over the electricity generated, specifically its transfer exclusively into their grid. A more balanced arrangement — whereby both sides would receive agreed portions of energy directly — remains essential but unattained due to ongoing inflexibility.

**New Crossing Points:** Despite assurances made to the Secretary-General, the Greek Cypriot leader has failed to follow through on commitments to propose two new crossings. There is high congestion at the main crossing point with vehicles at Metehan, often resulting in prolonged delays. The Turkish Cypriot side has proposed new vehicle crossing points at Haspolat and Akıncılar to alleviate this pressure. However, these proposals have not been positively received, primarily due to the Greek Cypriot side's continued insistence on problematic transit corridor concepts under the guise of “reciprocity”.

The broad desire among both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots for improved mobility and daily life should not be constrained by rigid positions or opportunistic ideas for military advantage.

Another development of serious concern has emerged in the form of an escalating policy of legal and political threats pursued by the Greek Cypriot leadership. A growing number of Turkish Cypriots now express reluctance to travel to the South or abroad, due to the risk of detention based on enforcement of legal provisions from 1959, amended in 2006 but kept dormant until recently. These provisions are being enforced so as to label all lawful actions in relation to properties left by Greek Cypriots in 1974 in the TRNC as unlawful, and the individuals who have had dealings with such properties in accordance with the TRNC law as suspects of a crime. The timing and selective implementation of these provisions suggest a politically motivated strategy rather than a routine application of the law.

This practice has caused widespread anxiety and is viewed as a deliberate strategy to isolate and intimidate. These politically motivated actions directed at individuals result in the violation of their human rights, including right to liberty and security, freedom of movement and right to property.

Utilizing international policing mechanisms such as INTERPOL, the Greek Cypriot side has sought to issue international arrest warrants against individuals who have engaged in lawful transactions in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This campaign affects not only Turkish Cypriot citizens but also foreign investors, thereby introducing a significant risk to economic stability and people to people contacts.

It must be recalled that since 2005, Greek Cypriot property claimants have had access to the Immovable Property Commission (IPC), which provides remedies that include restitution, compensation, and exchange. The IPC was shaped under the guidance of the European Court of Human Rights and has been confirmed by the said Court to be an effective domestic remedy mechanism.

The cumulative effect of these actions has created a heightened climate of fear among the Turkish Cypriots. We are continuing to exercise restraint despite growing public pressure to retaliate in kind. However, if the current trajectory is maintained, it will become increasingly difficult to preserve the conditions necessary for a dialogue.

This situation represents not merely a legal or procedural matter, but a broader political issue that threatens to undermine the new atmosphere of engagement that has recently been fostered. It is therefore essential that this Greek Cypriot intimidation policy is stopped immediately.

The sustainability of dialogue depends on a steadfast commitment to mutual respect and the rebuilding of trust. Unlawful and hostile actions that jeopardize these principles must be addressed with urgency, lest the window for renewed engagement begins to close once again, potentially leading to a point of no return.

I will be attending the upcoming informal meeting, scheduled towards the end of July, in a constructive spirit. The Turkish Cypriot side remains committed to a negotiated settlement. We are ready to negotiate a settlement based on the cooperation of two States on the basis of sovereign equality and equal international status.

We cannot be expected to surrender to the Greek Cypriot side, which has usurped its status through force of arms and is now using it as an instrument of hostility and a means to threaten us, while at the same time questioning our sincerity and commitment to a peaceful settlement.

If the aim is to preserve and further develop the new atmosphere conducive to nurturing a culture of cooperation to build mutual trust, it is the responsibility of the international community to ensure that this hostile policy is brought to an end.

## **Technical Committees**

Under the current political circumstances, the Technical Committees remain a valuable tool for formal communication as well as the training ground for cooperation between the two Sides, addressing issues that directly impact the daily lives of both the Turkish Cypriot People and the Greek Cypriot People. As such, they fundamentally differ in nature from civil society related processes. In spite of the crucial role the technical committees play in trust building, they are yet to reach their full potential, largely due to the reluctance of the Greek Cypriot leader to ensure their effective functioning under the pretext that they may lead to the “upgrading” of our status.

The Technical Committee on Youth has been established in line with the agreement reached between the two Leaders at the informal meeting on Cyprus in a broader format held in Geneva on 17-18 March 2025. Following the exchange of a list of 16 members comprising 8 women and 8 men from each side on 16 April 2025, the Committee held its first meeting on 5 May 2025 with the participation of the two Leaders and has since been meeting regularly.

The Technical Committee on Health continues its work on vector-borne diseases, also known as the mosquito project, across the island. Moreover, work has commenced on a study designed to prepare procedures for managing future pandemics, similar to COVID-19, with discussions on this topic still ongoing. Turkish Cypriot side also put forward a proposal for a study examining the potential public health impacts of climate change. As far as the crossing of pets from the crossing points, which continue to be prohibited, is concerned, the paper jointly prepared by Veterinary Sub-Committee was rejected at the political level by the Greek Cypriot side. It has also not been possible for the said committee to meet to continue its discussions on this very important issue in the reporting period due to the “unavailability” of the Greek Cypriot members.

The Technical Committee on Economic and Commercial Matters has continued its efforts to increase economic and commercial exchanges between the two sides. However, the project regarding the Young Professionals Internship Program could not be implemented due to the Greek Cypriot side’s lack of willingness to proceed. In addition, a seminar proposed by the Turkish Cypriot Side, aimed at enhancing cooperation between the two Sides by bringing together companies from both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Sides, as well as another seminar proposed to be held with the participation of businesswomen from both sides, unfortunately could not be realized due to the negative stance of the Greek Cypriot side. Concerning the long-standing issue of exchanging worn-out Euro banknotes, we will continue to closely follow the outcomes of the recent developments, with the hope of achieving concrete progress.

In the Technical Committee on Crossings, the Turkish Cypriot Side actively contributes to the development of a joint project at the Metehan crossing point. The project aims to improve the crossings’ functionality by narrowing the existing central island, adding extra lanes in both directions, and enhancing pedestrian and disabled access. Although a tender for the design phase was issued, it failed to attract applications. In response, UNDP began seeking alternative means of implementing the project. Demonstrating its commitment, the Turkish Cypriot Side promptly



submitted the names of a design bureau, a topographer, and a quantity surveyor to support the project's technical aspects and help expedite progress.

In the Technical Committee on Crisis Management, the Turkish Cypriot side prioritized the enhancement of joint preparedness efforts, particularly for natural disasters such as earthquakes. Proposals included organizing a joint earthquake conference, updating the island's seismic map, establishing an earthquake laboratory, creating a crisis management center, and conducting joint resistance tests on selected structures. The Greek Cypriot side has not yet provided its list of priorities.

The Technical Committee on Education has also seen active participation from the Turkish Cypriot side, especially in preparing a joint environmental education project. The Committee meets regularly and continues its exchanges.

In the Technical Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, the Turkish Cypriot side demonstrated a strong commitment to advancing three primary projects. These include a forum focusing on disability and sustainability, a project addressing the role of digital technology in enhancing the social inclusion of older individuals, and a panel discussing water consumption in view of climate change and from a humanitarian perspective. The Turkish Cypriot Side actively submitted proposals and recommendations to ensure that these projects proceed inclusively and meaningfully for both sides.

The Technical Committee on Environment, has been tasked by the two Leaders as part of the six initiatives agreed in Geneva, to work on the potential impact of climate change and in the reporting period this issue has been its focus. While successfully continuing its work on previously agreed projects, it has also begun new initiatives like a Bee Workshop and pest management. Emphasis on youth participation, biodiversity conservation, sustainable environmental practices, and cooperation with other committees and UN agencies remain central to these activities.

The Technical Committee on Gender Equality, in collaboration with the Technical Committee on Environment, continues its work on the Strengthening Gender Equality in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) for Climate Resilience project. This initiative aims to identify potential climate-related risks faced by women in STEM fields, increase awareness among young women and students, and encourage their active and meaningful participation in STEM education and green employment opportunities, thereby contributing to the island of Cyprus' broader climate resilience efforts.

The Technical Committee on Broadcasting and Telecommunications continued to address several issues. One key project involves promoting the use of green energy in the communication and telecommunication sector. The two sides also addressed FM radio frequency overlaps, agreeing on coordinated actions and regular monitoring to avoid interference. Disagreements over digital TV channel allocations, especially concerning Channel 41, led to a decision to draft a joint working document to resolve these disputes through ongoing dialogue.

The Technical Committee on Culture, launched its new website on World Art Day on 15 April 2025, offering access to past events, upcoming activities, and networking opportunities for artists and cultural professionals. The Committee is presently evaluating proposals submitted at the Connecting Arts 2 event.

The Technical Committee on Crime and Criminal Matters, continued its collaboration on crime and criminal matters. In this context, it has been exchanging information and handing over criminals between the two sides.

The Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage is currently engaged in the restoration of cemeteries on both sides of the island as part of the six initiatives agreed by the

two Leaders in the informal meeting in broader format held in Geneva. Following comprehensive discussions within the Committee, two lists comprising 15 cemeteries from each side were mutually exchanged, and preparatory work for the restoration activities was immediately initiated. The Committee also continues to actively work on the protection, preservation, and promotion of shared archaeological, religious, and civil cultural heritage of the island of Cyprus.

### **Property related arrests carried out by the Greek Cypriot leadership and its isolationist measures**

During the reporting period, the Greek Cypriot leadership has intensified obstructionist and isolationist measures targeting the Turkish Cypriot people. A key concern has been the implementation of punitive legal actions against property investors engaging in lawful transactions within the TRNC. These actions, particularly arrests and imprisonment, are part of a broader systematic campaign and policy by the Greek Cypriot leadership to intimidate investors and disrupt the economic stability of the Turkish Cypriot People.

The Greek Cypriot leadership has, during the reporting period, re-amended its penal code, thereby providing for heavier sentences for those who enter the scope of the said law.

During this period, the Greek Cypriot leader has stated that arrests will be continued whilst at the same time claiming that it is a judicial process. Amending the penal code itself has demonstrated that the motive instigated by the Greek Cypriot leader is purely political.

The actions by the Greek Cypriot leader have caused uproar in different circles of the Turkish Cypriot society across the political spectrum and economic organizations in the TRNC.

In this context, it should be underlined that the trial of the property investor Simon Aykut, who was arrested whilst crossing to South Cyprus in June last year, is continuing. Serious concerns have been raised that he will not be facing a fair trial.

Furthermore, in May, two female Hungarian nationals were sentenced to 2.5 years and 15 months imprisonment respectively, for brokering property sales in the TRNC. Reports have also been circulating that more than 50 cases have been opened against property investors – including Turkish and Turkish Cypriot individuals, whilst International Arrest Warrants have also been issued.

This legislation represents a deliberate act of bad faith, undermining the legal certainty of those who have engaged in lawful activity in the TRNC. It also disregards the existence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) sanctioned Immovable Property Commission (IPC), a mechanism established in 2005. ECtHR rulings have stated in clear unambiguous terms that the property issue for Greek Cypriot applicants relating to immovable property can be settled by the IPC prior to a settlement, or that the Greek Cypriot applicants wait for a political settlement to be reached between the two Sides.

The IPC, which provides effective legal remedies based on compensation, exchange and restitution, has resolved 2,171 out of 8,164 applications, with 215 finalized in 2025 alone. The legal body has paid over £538 million in compensation and functions under ECtHR-endorsed criteria to ensure fairness for all parties involved.

Despite the existence of an established legal mechanism, the Greek Cypriot Administration continues to pursue prosecutions under domestic law, violating both the spirit and the letter of international legal standards.

Further isolation efforts include state sponsored acts that have targeted tourism operators and higher education institutions in the TRNC, and persistent restrictions on international representation, trade, travel, and cultural participation. Turkish Cypriots remain excluded from global events such as the Olympics, FIFA, and UEFA—discriminatory practices that have persisted for over six decades despite international awareness.

## **Elements of Racism and Xenophobia in the Greek Cypriot Education System**

The Greek Cypriot education system has made no reforms in addressing concerns related to the negative perceptions of Turkish Cypriots, in educational content—including textbooks—reflecting elements of racism, prejudice, and xenophobia. This archaic mentality and the ongoing resistance to change presents a significant barrier to fostering mutual understanding and trust between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot youth.

Greek Cypriot schoolchildren, under the directive of the Greek Cypriot Minister of Education, participated in events in classrooms and parades in South Cyprus on April 1, 2025 - also attended by the Greek Cypriot leader - to commemorate the EOKA terrorist organization that was responsible for mass killings of Turkish Cypriots.

There continue to be reports of widespread hate speech in Greek Cypriot society, that had also been identified in the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) in 2023.

## **Status of UNFICYP Operations in the TRNC**

At the request of the United Nations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the TRNC submitted a counterproposal on 29 March 2024. This proposal seeks to establish a formal legal framework governing the presence and operations of the UNFICYP within the TRNC and the buffer zone. The Ministry continues to await an official response from UN Headquarters on the matter.

## **The Committee on Missing Persons (CMP)**

The Office of the Turkish Cypriot Member continued to utilize aerial photographs from 1974, which support the CMP in making informed decisions regarding potential excavation sites. Since December 2024, the Office has reviewed 25 separate coordinates across 20 different regions.

During the current reporting period, the CMP carried out excavations at 34 suspected burial locations within the TRNC, 15 of which were situated in military zones. At present, there are eight excavation teams active across the island: seven operating in the TRNC—including one in a military area—and one on the Greek Cypriot side.

Furthermore, additional financial resources were secured in order to ensure the CMP is adequately equipped to carry out its work. In February 2025, with donations from the Republic of Türkiye, the CMP acquired a lowbed trailer and an excavator, costing £34,500 and €92,000 respectively. These additions have enhanced the CMP's excavation capability.

The CMP remains committed to its mission of providing closure to the families of missing persons—both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot—who continue to seek a dignified burial for their loved ones. During this reporting period, the CMP successfully identified three individuals from its official list: one Turkish Cypriot and two Greek Cypriots.

## **Hellim/Halloumi**

Despite four Turkish Cypriot hellim/halloumi producers being granted a Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) – the last PDO being granted in January 2025 during the reporting period, a majority of Turkish Cypriot producers still remain unable to export PDO-compliant hellim/halloumi to the European Union (EU) market. Although the EU adopted the necessary legislation four years ago, longstanding implementation issues persist.

A key obstacle is the continued absence of an appointed body to carry out the required Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) checks, as stipulated in the Commission's April 2021 decision. As a result, even those producers who meet PDO standards remain barred from trade, pending the conclusion of protracted bureaucratic processes. Meanwhile, they face additional difficulties due to unilateral measures enacted by the Greek Cypriot side without consultation or consent.

An example includes the Greek Cypriot authorities' attempt to register "Cyprus Red Soil Potato" as a Protected Geographical Indication solely for the benefit of Greek Cypriot producers—despite its recognition as a product originating across the entire island. This move reflects a continuing pattern of exploiting EU mechanisms for unilateral gain, sidelining Turkish Cypriot interests.

The ongoing exclusion and unequal treatment of Turkish Cypriot producers remains a serious concern, highlighting the Greek Cypriot leadership's apparent intent to monopolize economic benefits from shared cultural products—products originally registered to help address the economic imbalance on the island.

## **Hydrocarbons**

Regrettably, the potential to transform hydrocarbons from a source of dispute into an area of cooperation remains unrealized in this reporting period. I reaffirm my commitment to the proposal for cooperation on hydrocarbon resources, which I had extended to the Greek Cypriot leader via the UN Secretary-General on 1 July 2022.

## **Maraş**

During this reporting period, the number of applications submitted by former Greek Cypriot inhabitants of Maraş to the Immovable Property Commission (IPC) concerning properties in the closed area has reached 577. The IPC continues to assess and process these outstanding applications.

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